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Abstract 
The article investigates how British European policy thinking has been informed by what it 
identifies as an ‘outsider’ tradition of thinking about ‘Europe’ in British foreign policy dating 
from imperial times to the presen. The article begins by delineating five phases in the 
evolution of the outsider tradition through a survey of the relevant historiography back to 
1815. The article then examines how prime ministers from Margaret Thatcher to David 
Cameron have looked to various inflections of the outsider tradition to inform their European 
discourses. The focus in the speech data sections is on British identity, history and the realist 
appreciation of international politics that informed the leaders’ suggestions for EEC/EU 
reform. The central argument is that historically informed narratives such as those making up 
the outsider tradition do not determine opinion-formers’ outlooks, but that they can be deeply 
impervious to rapid change.  
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Interpreting the Outsider Tradition in British European Policy Speeches from Thatcher 
to Cameron1 
 
In terms of its foreign policy orientation Britain has often been labelled a ‘stranger in 
Europe’, home to a nation of ‘reluctant Europeans’, sitting ‘on the sidelines’ of integration, 
politically, geographically and emotionally (Gowland and Turner, 1999; Wall, 2008; 
Gowland et al., 2010). Elite decision-makers in London were extremely cautious about 
throwing Britain’s full weight behind supranational integration initiatives after 1945. On 
joining the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 – known since 1993 as the 
European Union (EU) – Britain assumed the mantle of ‘awkward partner’ (George, 1994), 
locked in an uncomfortable ‘semi-detached’ relationship with the organization (Jenkins, 
1983, p. 147; George, 1992; Callaghan, 2007, pp. 213-214). In this politically charged 
historical reading (treated in Daddow, 2004) Britain ‘missed the bus’, was compelled to jump 
aboard a vehicle London elites judged to be going in the wrong, supranational, direction, but 
then found interminable problems adapting to a ‘Europe cut to a French pattern’ (Camps, 
1966, p. 45). Britain is not the only EU member or non-member state to be written off as a 
European laggard (for instance Gstöhl, 2002). However, its position as a large and influential 
member state that energetically engages in certain integrationist endeavours, while at other 
times acting as a lightning conductor for countries wishing to fragment the European project 
in the name of diversity, makes it a compelling focus for academic attention.  
The article conceptualizes the ‘outsider tradition’ (OT for short) in British European 
policy as a multidimensional package of narratives which sustains the belief, even amongst 
many of those who profess the benefits of an activist European policy, that Britain is a 
European actor of an exceptional kind. Drawing on the useful categorization in Nicholas 
Crowson’s (2011) account of the history of the debate about ‘limited liability versus 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to the following readers for commenting so helpfully on earlier drafts of this article: Richard 
Corbett, Alun Munslow, Tim Oliver and Stephen Wall. 
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continental commitment’ in British-European relations, the article contends that unpacking 
the OT is a fruitful way of appreciating the dynamics of the long-lasting national debate 
about the ‘meaning’ of ‘Europe’ to the British in identity as opposed to material interest 
terms (insightfully Taylor, 1990). The argument pursued in the article is that we can 
understand why Britain has come to hover near the EU exit door because British leaders have 
consistently drawn upon ‘outsider’ narratives as the organizing frame for their European 
policy discourses. The article centres on the views of five prime ministers from Margaret 
Thatcher to David Cameron – taking in John Major, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown in 
between – expressed in speeches from 1988 to 2013. Together, these five leaders have 
constructed what is currently held to be the mainstream government discourse on British 
European policy. Their discourse, remarkably consistent in this period, is held up as the 
‘establishment’ British position against which ‘soft’ sceptics and avowed, ‘hard’ EU 
withdrawal-ists both kick (see the article on UKIP, for example, in this volume). The analysis 
below reveals that even inside the EEC/EU, British leaders have perpetuated the rhetoric of 
limited liability, even when policy practice has clearly entrenched the value of the continental 
commitment.  
This argument is advanced in three parts. The first part surveys the historiography of 
British European policy back to 1815 to suggest that it is a pragmatic British narrative 
responding to various Europe-related policy dilemmas in British foreign policy by satisfying 
the competing claims of the exponents of limited liability on the one hand, and continental 
commitment on the other. The second part delves into the identity-based elements of the OT, 
with special reference to prime ministerial constructions of British and European identity in 
speeches from 1988 to 2013. The final part considers the ways in which Britain’s European 
reform proposals, especially on sovereignty and subsidiarity, have adapted rather than done 
away with earlier manifestations of the outsider tradition.  
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The outsider tradition in the historiography 
This article builds on recent work in interpretivist international relations by treating the OT as 
the discursive rationalization of British diplomatic practices which have arisen, largely 
reactively, in response to a series of European policy dilemmas. These dilemmas have posed 
an existential identity-based question to British decision-makers: is Britain a part of Europe 
or not? Significantly, given its national cultural resonance, the article does not link the OT to 
any particular domestic political tradition in Britain, preferring to explore how it cross-cuts 
partisan narratives with ‘Atlanticism, pro-Europeanism and pro-Commonwealth ideas’ (Bevir 
et al., 2013, p. 168). It is therefore beyond the scope of the article to trace how specific 
political traditions such as conservatism, whiggism, socialism and liberalism interplay with 
the OT. However, this could be a fruitful avenue for onward research and the most obvious 
are flagged up in the speech data sections below. 
The OT in British European policy emerged as a technique for managing (but never 
resolving) intra-party, Cabinet and Whitehall battles between the proponents of limited 
liability on the one hand and those pushing for a continental commitment on the other. 
Clearly, even as an ‘outsider’ Britain has never been isolated from, or disinterested in, 
European affairs. London decision-makers often feared the consequences of staying outside 
formal integration initiatives after 1945, just as before that time they feared a shift in the 
balance of power on the continent which might threaten British security or prosperity. As 
Austen Chamberlain, Foreign Secretary in Stanley Baldwin’s Labour government of 1924-29, 
explained: ‘The fact is that we have never been able to free ourselves from the conditions 
which geography has set for us, and if that same geographical position has been the origin of 
our colonizing enterprise and world-wide empire, it has not less clearly determined that we 
cannot separate our fortunes from those of Europe’ (Chamberlain, 1930, p. 183). The 
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question has been, therefore, not the false one between isolationism or engagement, but what 
depth and manner of European engagement is appropriate to sustain the sense of self the 
British have sought to acquire for themselves, and to enable them to translate that self-image 
into a workable foreign policy that helps make the world safe for the realization of British 
interests.  As the table below illustrates, the OT has developed as a grand narrative tradition 
within which these dilemmas have been thought about, managed (or put off) and legitimated 
publicly through political discourse. As Vivien Schmidt remarks (2000, p. 278), this is all 
about the creation and projection of ‘a coherent vision of how the nation fits into an 
integrating Europe and a globalizing world’. The study of political language helps us 
ascertain how those discursive structures – called here traditions – have evolved, sedimented 
in policy thinking, and mutated over time in response to dilemmas. Several different 
manifestations of ‘outsider-liness’ have been in evidence, and the phases identified below 
reflect critical junctures in the historiography on British-European relations over the past two 
centuries.  
 
Table 1: The Outsider Tradition in British European Policy 
Phase and dates Dilemmas faced Policy orientation 
PHASE 1 
1815-1939 
Development and 
management of Empire 
 
Rise and fall of potential 
European hegemons, 
particularly France and 
Russia 
 
World War One 
 
Outsider as balancer 
Stay out of European politics 
and conflicts unless 
compelled by force of events 
PHASE 2 
1939-1955 
World War Two and early 
Cold War years  
 
Imperial overstretch and 
early years of decolonization, 
for example in India 
 
Outsider as supporter 
Encourage unity, associate 
with initiatives, eg ECSC, 
and sometimes provide 
leadership, eg WEU. 
Maintain UK commitment to 
the defence of Western 
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Loss of ‘great power’ status 
(rise of US and Russia) 
 
Economic degradation 
 
Europe, via NATO and 
British Army of the Rhine. 
 
PHASE 3a 
1955-1956 
Revival of supranational 
approach to European 
integration 
 
Decolonization continuing  
 
Outsider as saboteur 
Turn US against common 
market and tempt key nations 
such as Germany towards 
looser trading arrangements 
PHASE 3b 
1956-1960 
Successful conclusion of 
Spaak Committee 
negotiations 
 
Suez Crisis and Anglo-
American tensions 
 
Outsider as rival 
Damage limitation via failed 
attempt to negotiate a 
European free trade area and 
successful creation of EFTA  
PHASE 4 
1960-1973 
Structural shifts in global 
trade patterns 
 
‘Winds of change’ blowing 
through Empire 
 
Emergence of ‘declinist’ 
thesis in British politics 
 
Outsider as supplicant 
France vetoed first two 
applications, but negotiations 
hampered throughout by 
tactics, eg on Commonwealth 
preferences 
PHASE 5 
1973-2017 
Adapting to EEC 
membership and transition 
from EEC to more 
supranational EU 
 
‘Second Cold War’ in 1980s 
and end of Cold War in 1989 
 
Public and media scrutiny of 
European affairs: issue 
management 
 
Party political splits over 
‘Europe’ 
 
Outsider as insider 
Leadership on issues such as 
Single European Market and 
deregulation, accompanied 
by disputes over budget and 
British rebate. Increasing use 
of opt-outs in politically 
sensitive matters. Possibility 
of withdrawal from EU after 
referendum. 
 
Phase 1 
The first phase covers the rise of the British Empire, which was built from the time of 
American independence in 1783 to 1939, and developed into a global strategy after the defeat 
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of Napoleon in the nineteenth century, when Britain energetically pursued imperial expansion 
in Africa, Asia and the Pacific. The corollary in Europe was limited liability, whereby Britain 
acted as a power balancer against continental threats and adversaries. There were periods of 
active leadership in the form of a continental commitment, for example in creating and 
sustaining the Concert of Europe from 1815. Nonetheless, Foreign Secretary Robert 
Castlereagh summed up the preferred British position in a paper of May 1820 in which he 
wrote that Britain came into its own ‘when actual danger menaces the system of Europe’. 
Without imminent threat, he went on, ‘this country cannot and will not act upon abstract and 
speculative principles of precaution’ (quoted in Goodlad, 2008, p. 13). This conservative 
reading of international affairs has been in the ascendancy in British European policy 
thinking since this time, as the final section of the article will demonstrate. The French, 
Russian and latterly the German threats to Britain’s European and imperial interests were 
persistent concerns for British statesmen in this period (Turner, 2010, pp. 1-5). This phase 
culminated in the turbulent interwar years 1919-1939 when ‘despite increasing pressures to 
involve itself in continental affairs, Britain preferred to support a balance of power in Europe 
from the outside, as the best way to preserve its liberal institutions, its world trade and its 
military security’ (Young, 2000, p. 3). 
Interwar proposals for European co-operation were more often than not put together 
by individuals and groups outside of Britain, supporting Michael Gehler and Wolfram 
Kaiser’s argument (2001, pp.  785-786) that the impetus towards transnational co-operation 
and the pooling of sovereignty in Europe was a much more pressing concern for continental 
opinion formers than for their British equivalents. For instance, Austrian Count Coudenove-
Kalergi led the ‘pan-European’ movement that flourished after World War One. He was 
dismissed by Sir William Tyrell, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, as ‘a 
thoroughly impractical theorist’ (quoted in Young, 2000, p. 4. See also Crowson, 2011, pp. 
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19-29). In line with the pragmatic, conservative reading of foreign affairs, this has come to be 
a characteristic British refrain against plans for unity, as we shall also see later. Other notable 
unity-related proposals in this period were met with similar scepticism in Britain on 
economic, political and security grounds. They included the 1926 plan for an international 
steel cartel and its proposed extension in 1929-30 via the offer of European Union by French 
foreign minister Aristide Briand (Crowson, 2011, pp.  29-30). Churchill’s words from 1930 
were emblematic of the British approach in the interwar years: ‘we have our own dream and 
our own task. We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked but not comprised. We are 
interested and associated but not absorbed’ (cited Crowson, 2011, p. 31).  
 
Phase 2 
The period from 1939 to near the end of 1955 was themed around a strenuous war effort, the 
resulting economic retrenchment and Cold War insecurity. In these years British foreign 
policy thinking remained fairly consistent in tone and substance, despite the shift from 
wartime coalition, through reforming ‘socialist’ Labour government in 1945-51, and finally 
to Conservative government in 1951-55. As during Phase 1 there was no consistent 
immersion by British political parties in the transnational political networks that evolved 
from 1945, such as the Geneva Circle and Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (Gehler and 
Kaiser, 2001). Establishment Britain encouraged European unity whilst wishing to maintain a 
free hand in line with the limited liability conception of Britain’s global role articulated by 
Churchill (Younger, 1972, p. 580). Security and defence considerations featured prominently 
in Britain’s largely negative response to European integration initiatives in the 1950s, as, 
critically, did the economics of the imperial preference system (Smith, 1950, p. 474). Part of 
the reason for the concentration on financial affairs was institutional, in that the Treasury 
dominated the direction of policy towards European co-operation ‘in a fashion which 
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infringed neither essential UK independence nor the rival claims of the Commonwealth and 
Atlantic linkages’ (Ludlow, 2003, p. 88). The economic departments were sceptical of any 
European initiative which threatened to undermine Britain’s world trading role. Layered on 
top of these already formidable objections was an ideological component, manifested as the 
sovereignty-degrading aspects of involvement in a European collective (Callaghan, 2007, p. 
202; Young, 2000, p. 15).  
In Europe and globally, moreover, the Cold War was hotting up. Britain’s support for 
the defence of Western Europe largely came via the stationing of 50,000 personnel in the 
British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), maintained as part of its commitment to the US-
dominated North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (see Aldrich 2008).2 By February 
1949, limited liability towards Europe in the context of a grand strategy aimed at 
consolidating ‘Europe, the Commonwealth and America into a “natural unit”’ had become 
agreed British foreign policy strategy (Young, 2000, p. 23). Decision-making in this period 
lay in the hands of avowed ‘Cold War warriors’ such as Churchill, Attlee and Bevin, who 
came to think mainly ‘in terms of Britain’s traditional role of creating a balance of power on 
the continent’ and ‘did not see why Britain had to get involved in European structures’ 
(Turner, 2010, p. 54). Britain resolutely stayed out of the Schuman Plan for a European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) whilst seeking association from without. Such European 
entanglements as were sanctioned centred on intergovernmental organizations such as the 
1948 Council of Europe. Meanwhile, in 1954, Anthony Eden rescued European defence co-
operation in the aftermath of the failed European Defence Community (EDC) proposal 
through the creation of Western European Union (WEU). However, ‘the high point of the 
British contribution to European unity’ would not last long (Deighton, 1998, p. 196). London 
underestimated the desire of the Six to press ahead with expanded economic co-operation, 
                                                 
2 I am grateful to Jocelyn Mawdsley for reminding me of the military dimension here.  
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and might have been alerted by the disdainful verdict on WEU delivered by Robert Schuman 
in October 1954: ‘a London façade in the English style, decorated in the Parisian way’ 
(quoted in Gehler and Kaiser, 2001, p. 791). By the end of 1955 the OT had clearly become 
the leitmotif of British European policy, an achieved and ascribed identity which resonated in 
and outside Whitehall. 
 
Phase 3 
The next four years, 1956-60, saw a rapid burst of innovation in the OT as London policy-
makers, caught on the back foot, struggled to devise a coherent response to the rélance of 
integration at Messina. First, Britain made a short-lived attempt to sabotage the Six’s 
integrationist ambitions (Phase 3a). It then embarked on a period of competition with them by 
trying to launch a rival British-led European project (Phase 3b). British European policy in 
this phase has been described appropriately by the historian John Young as transitioning from 
from ‘benevolent neutrality’ to ‘sabotage’ (Young, 2000). Probably for the very reason that 
Britain’s initial attempt to engage with supranational integration was to kill it off, 
developments in the OT in Phase 3 have tainted the making, packaging and reception of 
British European policy to the present day. All UK leaders have had to head off potential 
charges of betrayal when setting out alternative visions for the future of European integration 
(see below).  
Phase 3a followed Britain’s withdrawal from the Spaak Committee negotiations on 
the EEC in November 1955, after which Britain tried to talk the US out of supporting the 
Messina exercise. London also sought to exploit divisions within the German government 
between Europeanists and free trade liberals in a bid to persuade the latter against backing the 
common market idea. Crucially in this period Britain did not proffer an alternative (Schaad, 
1998, pp.  44-46 and p. 49). Rebuffed, the British then tried devising a substitute to the EEC 
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in the form of Plan G in the ‘rival’ Phase 3b – ‘a free trade area comprising the seventeen 
member countries of the OEEC [Organisation for European Economic Co-operation], 
surrounding and including the common market planned by the Messina six’ (Schaad, 1998, p. 
42. See also Young, 2000, p. 42; Ellison, 1996, pp.  1-34). Martin Schaad contends that Plan 
G was not intended as a plot to sabotage the common market negotiations underway in the 
Spaak Committee through 1956, certainly not in the official gloss put on its announcement. 
Nevertheless, the sense remains that, although never official policy, such an outcome would 
have been welcomed by key players such as Chancellor Harold Macmillan who feared ‘the 
revival of [West German] power through economic means. It is really giving them on a plate 
what we fought two wars to prevent’ (cited Schaad, 1998, p. 50). After two years of fraught 
and sometimes acrimonious negotiations, London fell back on a larger but looser European 
Free Trade Area (EFTA), comprising six other non-Messina states which shared Britain’s 
distaste for supranational integration, but which also feared economic discrimination from 
operating outside a European customs union. Ironically, however, the creation of EFTA in 
1959 ‘only brought forward the date when the common-market countries adopted a common 
external tariff’ (Callaghan, 2007, p. 203).  
 
Phase 4 
By the end of Phase 3 in 1960 the OT in British European policy had transformed in just a 
few years from support and encouragement, through attempted sabotage, and finally to the 
creation of a rival intergovernmental bloc aimed at protecting British economic interests. In 
Phase 4 Britain radically re-evaluated its European policy in light of ‘a growing sense of 
national malaise’ emanating from ‘social divisions, economic failure and loss of purpose’ that 
the creation of an alternative European project had done little to diminish (Young, 2000, p. 
65). Significantly, given the Treasury’s whip-hand over the decision-making process, it was 
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civil servants in the economic ministries who were most influential in suggesting that EEC 
membership would proffer two sets of solutions to the ‘British problem’. First, it would help 
the economy by stimulating growth, attracting US investment, promoting economies of scale 
and bolstering UK industrial competitiveness. It could not have been lost on the economic 
gurus in Whitehall that in 1958 the size of the West German economy overtook Britain’s for 
the first time since the Second World War (Callaghan, 2007, p. 203), although as George 
Peden (2013, p. 60) points out, such trends are more obvious in retrospect than to analysts at 
the time. Second, British membership of the EEC would promote stability in Cold War 
Europe, strengthen French-German relations and generally bolster the UK’s international 
influence, particularly with regard to London’s standing in the eyes of Washington policy-
makers (Young, 2000, pp.  65-66).  
Politicians such as Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd began to reflect the tenor of these 
internal discussions in public diplomacy, reorienting British European policy discourse to 
match the change in thinking. For example, he told the Assembly of the Council of Europe 
that Britain had been wrong not to join discussions on the ECSC and that ‘we regard 
ourselves as part of Europe, for reasons of sentiment, of history and geography’ (quoted in 
Crowson, 2011, p. 77). Spring 1960 thus marks the beginning of the prioritization within the 
OT of the narrative of outsider as supplicant. Economic affluence became a key plank in the 
case ‘for’ Europe in the heyday of British Europhilia (Beloff, 1963), encouraged by an 
appreciation that UK trade patterns had decisively shifted from Empire to Europe between 
1948 and 1968 (Mackintosh, 1969, p. 251).  The Conservative government of Harold 
Macmillan and the Labour government of Harold Wilson both drew on the emerging 
Whitehall consensus and applied unsuccessfully to gain membership of the EEC in the period 
1961-67 (Ludlow, 1997; Daddow, 2003),  before the Conservative government of Edward 
Heath reactivated the second bid in 1970, negotiating entry from 1 January 1973.  
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Phase 5 
Phase 5 covers the EEC/EU membership years from 1973 to the present. It is impossible to 
recount in detail the troubled history of UK membership, although five pertinent 
developments in the ‘outsider as insider’ inflection to the OT are worth mentioning. First, the 
weight of history, memory and identity questions in Britain’s national debates meant that 
‘Europe’ went from being a relatively obscure, technical area of government activity, largely 
masked from public view and apathetically debated in Parliament (Crowson, 2011, p. 67 and 
pp.  71-72), to being a hotly contested political issue. European policy since accession has 
become a significant yet vexatious issue for politicians, advisers, speech writers and spin 
doctors alike (Daddow, 2011). Second, and resulting from this, rifts over European policy 
split the Labour Party in the 1980s (Daniels, 1998; Palmer, 1982), led to the creation of a new 
party by pro-European Labour liberals, and threatened to tear the Conservative Party apart 
during the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in the 1990s (Berrington and Hague, 1998, p. 
65). The lure of the ‘special relationship’ and identity questions relating to the Empire-
Commonwealth were never far from the surface of these often agonized debates (Bevir et al., 
2014, p. 164). Third, and more  recently, ‘Europe’ has helped to recast the political landscape 
in Britain by creating space for the rise of anti-European and anti-establishment parties such 
as the Referendum Party and the UK Independence Party (see Tournier-Sol’s article in this 
collection).  
Fourth, European integration has increasingly attracted widespread and often negative 
media coverage in the UK (Wallace, 1986, p. 584 and p. 598; Daddow, 2012), the discredited 
‘follies of Brussels’ being a prime focus of the reportage (Unwin, 1981, p. 396). Finally, a 
variety of cross-party ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ Europe pressure groups have sprung up since EEC 
membership became a ‘live’ national political issue in the 1960s (see Forster, 2002). These 
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have interacted synergistically with media and political agendas to create a large groundswell 
of opinion against the EU in Britain on a variety of grounds. Since 2010, and for the first time 
since Community membership was gained in 1973, withdrawal from the European Union 
(EU), or the ‘Brexit’ option (Pertusot, 2013) has come to be been openly debated at the very 
highest levels of government (Morris, 2013), prompting considerable disquiet amongst key 
British allies in the EU and globally (Pickard and Parker, 2013; Watt, 2014). The rising 
salience of the Europe question in British politics resulted in the successful push for two 
widely watched live television debates on Britain’s EU membership between Deputy Prime 
Minister Nick Clegg and UKIP’s Nigel Farage, held in the run-up to the May elections to the 
European Parliament. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Farage’s anti-EU position was widely held to 
have won the day. The next part of this article examines how political elites have both 
reflected and fed the sense that Britain is a European actor of an exceptional kind in key 
speeches on British European policy 1988-2013. 
 
The outsider tradition from Bruges to Bloomberg  
This section argues that at times intentionally, and at others unwittingly, the five premiers 
from Thatcher to Cameron have been nudging Britain closer to the EU exit door in Phase 5 
by popularizing and legitimating different renderings of the OT tradition from Phases 1-4. 
What they have done, in short, is to underscore Britain’s aloofness from its European partners 
by harnessing imperial nostalgia to the search for a global focused foreign policy strategy 
which only occasionally, and reluctantly, presupposes a coincidence of ‘British’ and 
‘European’ interests. 
Every UK prime minister emphasized Britain’s inextricably European heritage whilst 
claiming an exceptional status for Britain. This was rooted in the geographical reality of the 
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British living an ‘island’ existence and a nostalgia for empire, together cueing outsider 
sentiments redolent of the OT that developed in Phases 1-4. They told: 
 
a story of continuity, by contrast with the fickle mutability of the continent, with its 
constantly changing regimes and borders and monarchs and constitutions; a story of 
the slow, steady organic growth of institutions, of Common Law, of Parliament, and a 
unique concept of sovereignty, vested in the Crown in Parliament (Garton Ash, 2001, 
p. 6).  
 
All the leaders looked to the history of common purpose between Britain and the continent, 
usually near the beginning of their addresses. Summoning this shared history and heritage, 
they instructed their audiences on the ways in which Britain had helped fashion European 
politics and society prior to the creation of the supranational European bus London missed in 
the 1950s. Gordon Brown put it thus: ‘Friends, today there is no old Europe, no new Europe, 
no east or west Europe. There is only one Europe. Our home Europe.’ (Brown 2009). For 
Brown it was possible to be British and European – the two identities were not mutually 
exclusive because of the history of common endeavour: ‘So I stand here today proud to be 
British and proud to be European, representing a country that does not see itself as an island 
adrift from Europe but as a country at the centre of Europe, not in Europe’s slipstream but 
firmly in its mainstream’ (Brown 2009). 
Conservative premiers delved back further into the past to construct the Britain and 
Europe story than did Labour leaders, Thatcher’s Bruges speech being the densest of the five, 
historically speaking. She reflected on blood ties and the everyday material experience of 
‘Europe’ in Britain emanating from ‘the straight lines of the roads the Romans built’ up and 
down Britain (Thatcher, 1988). In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, she said, Britain was 
16 
 
‘restructured’ under Norman and Angevin rule. In the seventeenth century the overthrow of 
King James II during the Glorious Revolution of 1689 thrust the British crown into the hands 
of the Dutch Prince William of Orange and his wife Queen Mary. The lesson Thatcher drew 
from these historical turning points was: ‘Visit the great churches and cathedrals of Britain, 
read our literature and listen to our language: all bear witness to the cultural riches which we 
have drawn from Europe and other Europeans from us’ (Thatcher, 1988).  
Compared to Thatcher’s heavy chronicle of events, her successors’ reading of history 
was skittish at best. For instance, in his Bloomberg speech of January 2013 Cameron reported 
that: ‘From Caesar’s legions to the Napoleonic Wars. From the Reformation, the 
Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution to the defeat of Nazism. We have helped to 
write European history, and Europe has helped write ours’ (Cameron, 2103). Every prime 
minister accepted the EU’s official founding myth about the ashes of war stimulating the 
drive to channel atavistic European nationalism into peaceable, cooperative ventures. Unity, 
Cameron said in 2009, ‘happened because of determined work over generations. A 
commitment to friendship and a resolve never to re-visit that dark past’ (Cameron, 2009). 
Before him, John Major agreed that: ‘The European Community was born to end divisions in 
Western Europe. It has succeeded’ (Major, 1994). Labour’s Tony Blair reeled off an 
‘impressive’ roll call of EU achievements: ‘peace and stability’, ‘trade, jobs and growth in 
Britain and other member states’, and the economic and social transformations it has 
delivered to new member states (Blair, 2002). Gordon Brown added environmental protection 
and the EU’s aid programme into the mix, reflecting on the power of ‘human will and 
courage of representatives with a mission’ to rout those who doubted Europe could unite and 
cooperate’ (Brown, 2009).  
This said, the the bridge-building between Britain and the continent extended only so 
far. It is noticeable that the OT has been used to inform the belief that Britain’s ‘island’ status 
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conferred upon it an exceptional position with regard to the European project. For instance, 
Thatcher remarked that aspects of Britain’s unique position in this regard came from its 
sometimes lonely role in helping save Europe, and Europeans, from themselves in times of 
conflict by acting as ‘a home for people from the rest of Europe who sought sanctuary from 
tyranny’ (Thatcher, 1988). Cameron affirmed that ‘We have the character of an island nation 
– independent, forthright, passionate in defence of our sovereignty’ (Cameron, 2013). That 
there has been a strong bipartisan consensus over the ‘island’ story is evident in Blair’s aside 
– in an otherwise strongly Europhile speech by British standards – that the British are 
undoubtedly an ‘island race’ (Blair, 2002). Speaking from this unique vantage point, British 
leaders have consistently proposed alternative visions of ‘Europe’ in a bid to reach out to 
countries thought to be uncomfortable about the drive towards a ‘federalist’ EU, sparking 
uncomfortable memories of Britain’s ‘sabotage’ policies in the formative years of the Treaty 
of Rome.  
Thus, the EU’s official presentation of its history as vindication of the foresight of the 
founding fathers was faithfully rehearsed, but with an important caveat from a British 
perspective: ‘Their vision proved right for its age. But it is outdated. It will not do now. We 
must all adjust our vision to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow’ (Major, 1994). 
Cameron developed Major’s point: ‘Healing those wounds of our history is the central story 
of the European Union…But today the main, over-riding purpose of the European Union is 
different: not to win peace, but to secure prosperity’ (Cameron, 2013). In Conservative 
leaders’ speeches especially, British-European history was told as the tale of hard won 
national freedoms now imperiled by the rise of an illiberal coercive power across the English 
Channel – another Armada, Napoleonic army or German tyranny, perhaps. In this way the 
prime ministers invoked the ‘outsider as rival’ narrative from Phase 3 by popularizing ‘other’ 
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visions for Europe which could subsume the EEC/EU approach (well covered in Garton Ash, 
2001, pp. 4-5).  
The alternatives suggested by British leaders reflected time and circumstance, 
indicating how traditions mutate in response as individuals respond to dilemmas posed by 
novel or unexpected global events. For example, speaking during the Cold War stand-off, 
Thatcher asserted that The EEC ‘is one manifestation of that European identity, but it is not 
the only one’ (Thatcher, 1988). Behind Churchill’s Iron Curtain (see Quinault, 1992, p. 10), 
she continued, European peoples in cities such as Warsaw, Prague and Budapest ‘who once 
enjoyed a full share of European culture, freedom and identity have been cut off from their 
roots’ (Thatcher, 1988). As European leaders after 1989 grappled with the consequences of 
German reunification and the prospect of Community enlargement to former Eastern blob 
countries, Major judged that the European project was incomplete all the ‘while so many 
European democracies remain outside the Union’ (Major, 1994). Later, he echoed Thatcher 
by claiming ‘the Poles, the Slovaks, the Hungarians’ and other peoples currently on the 
periphery, such as the Baltic states, were all part of the ‘European family’ (Major, 1994). A 
decade later, looking ahead to the largest single expansion of the EU via the incorporation of 
ten new states in May 2004, Blair judged that it amounted ‘to no less than the creation of a 
new Europe’ (Blair, 2002). Having reviewed the ways in which elites since accession have 
drawn on the OT to justify their opinion that Britain is a ‘special sort’ of European actor, and 
that the idea of Europe is ‘up for grabs’, the following section examines how the policy 
prescriptions on European reform that flowed from the beliefs about British and European 
identity the leaders expressed in their speeches. 
 
Sovereignty and subsidiarity: European reform proposals 
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Like all member states British leaders have engaged in European reform discussion in a bid 
to mould the European project in ways more amenable to British interests. Their rhetorical 
ploy has been to introduce reform proposals as a response to dilemmas posed by the crisis of 
legitimacy in EEC/EU governance, which has magnified in tandem with increasing 
contestation over the EU’s future direction. In doing so, the prime ministers were adapting 
the ‘outsider as rival’ tradition from later Phase 3b. However, where in the later 1950s the 
British free trade scheme sought to deflect the Six’s integration enthusiasm from outside, in 
Phase 5 London elites claimed to be accepting the basic legitimacy of the EEC/EU and 
wanting to reform it from inside. As a result, each leader was acutely aware of the propensity 
for British European policy visions to be interpreted – rightly or wrongly – as a form of Phase 
3a ‘sabotage’ which echoed London’s diplomacy towards the US and West Germany at the 
end of 1955. Liberal reforms of the EU were, therefore, spun by the prime ministers as a 
response to the existential dilemma of the EU’s democratic deficit, one that has gained 
traction across the EU and its member states, Eurosceptical and Euroenthusiast alike (Simms, 
2012, pp. 57-58), especially since the Eurozone crisis and latterly the 2014 European 
Parliament elections.  
In Bruges Thatcher said that Community reform was required otherwise ‘we shall not 
get the public support for the Community’s future development’, aiming her words on 
economic competition at an idealized ‘European consumer’ who would benefit from wider 
choice and lower costs (Thatcher, 1988). The Conservative focus on the economic benefits 
from deregulation, free markets and consumer choice was enhanced by Labour leaders in the 
social democratic tradition. For example, Brown identified consumer rights, workplace rights 
and social protection as touchstones of European success that needed safeguarding as 
integration progressed (Brown, 2009). Here, then, national partisan traditions shined through 
in specific areas of concern for the prime ministers. However, as they moved ‘up’ a level to 
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the crisis in EU governance more generally, partisan differences diminished because the 
leaders identified problems well recognized outside as well as inside Britain. For example, in 
1994 Major argued that the EU ‘seems temporarily to have lost the self-confidence of the 
1980s. Popular enthusiasm for the Union has waned. We need to listen to these warnings if 
we are to make the right moves in the future’ (Major, 1994). Blair defined the ‘democratic 
deficit’ as: apathy, disconnection from citizens, lack of understanding how [the EU] works’ 
(Blair, 2002). Cameron averred: ‘People are increasingly frustrated that decisions taken 
further and further away from them mean their living standards are slashed through enforced 
austerity or their taxes are used to bail out governments on the other side of the continent’ 
(Cameron, 2013).  
Whilst the specific ‘targets’ of British reform proposals naturally reflected prime 
ministerial perceptions of the EEC/EU as an institutional construct at the time of their 
address, their narratives reveal that two significant beliefs remained stable over this period. 
The first was the realist premise that political change occurs incrementally and practically, 
not by windy rhetoric or ‘abstract theory’ (see Hall, 2006, p. 181); the second was that the 
main agents of change, and focus for peoples’ loyalty, remain nation states. Both, in British 
eyes, cast doubt on the long-term viability of the ‘core’ European project codified in the 
Treaty of Rome and its updates Nice, Amsterdam and Lisbon. We will deal with each belief 
in turn.  
Every prime minister wanted to locate him or herself on the realist side of the realist-
idealist debate in International Relations theory (surveyed in Nau, 2008). This brand of 
realism is well illustrated by Henry Kissinger’s maxim that ‘nations live in history, not 
utopia, and thus must approach their goals in stages’ (Kissinger, 1982, p. 585). Drawing on 
this theoretical tradition, ‘The British have a generally well-founded suspicion of pious 
abstractions in foreign policy; they like to think of their own policy as pragmatic’ (Pym, 
21 
 
1982-83, p. 1). The prime ministers were suspicious of European integration by ‘grand 
design’, echoing Churchill’s preference for integration that would ‘roll forward on a tide of 
facts, events and impulses rather than by elaborate constitution-making’ (Quinault, 1992, p. 
9). Hence, Thatcher warned in the Bruges speech: ‘The Community is not an end in itself. 
Nor is it an institutional device to be constantly modified according to the dictates of some 
abstract intellectual concept’ (Thatcher, 1988).  The solution, she said, was ‘to take decisions 
on the next steps forward, rather than let ourselves be distracted by Utopian goals. Utopia 
never comes, because we know we should not like it if it did.’ (Thatcher, 1988). Reacting to 
Conservative Party infighting instigated by the Maastricht Treaty, Major’s Leiden speech 
reads as an extended defence of political realism: ‘We do not just want a futuristic grand 
design which never leaves the drawing board…The most constructive attitude to Europe is to 
plan a future that works…That is the fact of the matter. We need a vision grounded in 
reality…The European Union has never lacked for ideas for its development. But it needs 
ideas which work’ (Major, 1994).  
This characteristically Conservative take on realism in international relations, 
expressed as a preference for ‘specific institutional responses to demonstrable needs’ via 
prudence and pragmatism (Henig, 1975, p. 492; Harries, 2005, p. 607), also informed New 
Labour’s philosophy of European integration. For example, Blair worried about the 
propensity for Europe to drift ‘into the visionary waters of a European superstate’ when what 
was needed was ‘to anchor it properly and clearly where it belongs: with the nations of 
Europe’ (Blair, 2002). Brown was the only one of the five premiers not to entrench a British-
European distinction on rhetoric and reality in international politics. Discussing cooperation, 
free markets, redistribution and social justice, he said: ‘This is not simply our political 
philosophy – in Europe we believe these truths because we have lived them’ (Brown, 2009). 
All in all, however, the speeches reveal a sequence of leaders propounding the merits of 
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cautious incrementalism over abstruse constitutional engineering. Cameron exemplified that 
outlook by observing that Britain’s historically constituted identity has bred in it a certain 
‘sensibility’, meaning a perspective through which ‘we come to the European Union with a 
frame of mind that is more practical than emotional. For us, the European Union is a means 
to an end – prosperity, stability, the anchor of freedom and democracy both within Europe 
and beyond her shores – not an end in itself. We insistently ask: How? Why? To what end?’ 
(Cameron, 2013).  
The second element of Britain’s reform agenda (sovereignty and subsidiarity) evoked 
the Conservative tradition of nationhood and the libertarian critique of centralization, 
conformity and centralized planning. Every prime minister identified with former 
Conservative Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington’s opinion that: ‘There is strength in 
diversity, and also in unity’, but the trick is to develop ‘unity without uniformity’ 
(Carrington, , p. 6). In Bruges, Thatcher presaged much of what followed by arguing that 
‘willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build 
a successful Community’ (Thatcher, 1988). She worried that the EEC challenged historically 
constituted national identities and indicted the Community with various crimes against 
nationhood. They ranged from an ill-conceived ambition ‘to suppress nationhood and 
concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate’ to trying to compress nations 
‘into some sort of indentikit European personality’ (Thatcher, 1988). Major put the same 
view: ‘I believe the Nation State will remain the basic political unit in Europe’ (Major, 1994). 
Unlike Thatcher, who vilified the European Commission, Major’s sights were trained on the 
European Parliament, which he said made the mistake of seeing ‘itself as the future 
democratic focus for the Union’, a flawed belief because ‘the European Union is an 
association of States, deriving its basic legitimacy through national Parliaments’ (Major, 
1994). Cameron worked the same tradition in his Bloomberg speech: ‘There is not, in my 
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view, a European demos. It is national parliaments which are, and will remain, the true source 
of real democratic legitimacy and accountability in the EU’ (Cameron, 2013).  
Labour leaders paid similar homage to the nation-state in their European policy 
speeches. However, in line with a collective approach to solving transnational problems in an 
era of interdependence, Blair and Brown judged this to be a question of ‘the challenge of 
cooperation across borders, of coordination between peoples, and of achieving unity out of 
diversity’ (Brown, 2009). In Cardiff, Blair mimicked Thatcher: ‘the driving ideology is 
indeed a union of nations not a superstate subsuming national sovereignty and national 
identity’ (Blair, 2002). But Blair then diverged from her template by praising the ‘carefully 
balanced’ institutional design of the EU, centring on the ‘triangle’ of Council, Commission 
and Parliament, backed by the legal rulings of the Court of Justice. ‘They represent a 
quantum leap in democratic governance on an international scale – the pooling of sovereignty 
in order to extend the reach of democratic action’ (Blair, 2002). Thatcherite but only to a 
degree, Blair adapted the conservative tradition by legitimizing the liberal-friendly theme of 
pooled sovereignty: ‘whilst the origin of European power is the will of sovereign nations, 
European power nonetheless exists and has its own authority and capability to act’ (Blair, 
2002). The ‘practical’ case for pooled sovereignty was a theme of speeches by other 
influential Labour people during the 1990s (for instance Robertson, 1998). It went some way 
to transcending what they took to be a limited and inaccurate ‘either/or’ understanding of 
sovereignty in the Conservative veneration of nationhood and independence. Moving away 
from a zero-sum reading of regional power dynamics, New Labour people could foresee 
circumstances in which European integration moved ahead ‘without compromising the 
identity of the component units, and neither controls the other’ (Bogdanor, 2005, p. 699).  
Blair’s speech also stood out because he recognized the importance to Europe’s 
integrative venture of a favourite UK bête noire, the European Commission. He sympathized 
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with those in the political and media classes who castigated it for being a ‘remote 
bureaucracy’ taking ‘unpopular decisions’ but said that it had not always ‘managed its 
internal affairs well’- an allusion amongst other things to the resignation of the Santer 
Commission amidst accusations of corruption and fraud in 1999 (Ringe, 2003). Nonetheless, 
Blair believed the Commission was ‘essential’ as ‘the best guarantee of equality in the 
Union’, favouring ‘strengthening the Commission’s authority in making sure Europe’s rules 
are obeyed’ (Blair, 2002). In a small way, this is an example of sites of resistances being 
created within a dominant discourse, the intention being to persuade audiences of the 
fallibility of that dominant reading. It was easy to overlook the resistances even in this 
notionally Europhile speech, however, because Blair’s bottom line was that: ‘We want a 
Europe of sovereign nations, countries proud of their own distinctive identity, but co-
operating together for mutual good. We fear that the driving ideology behind European 
integration is a move to a European superstate, in which power is sucked into an 
unaccountable centre’ (Blair, 2002).  
The solution to the problem of EU centralization and conformity breeding ‘fudge and 
muddle, bureaucratic meddling’ (Blair, 2002) was a robust and enforceable version of 
subsidiarity which could offset what Thatcher saw as power being ‘centralised in Brussels or 
decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy’ (Thatcher, 1988). The main distinction on 
this issue between Conservative and Labour leaders was therefore on emphasis and 
presentation. Conservative premiers allied their case for ‘no more Europe’ to a clear 
preference for ‘less Commission’. By contrast, the Labour agenda assumed greater member 
state involvement early on in the legislative process, especially in the European Council and 
Council of Ministers – all in all a more cooperative outlook. For example, Blair saw the 
subsidiarity principle being enshrined in ‘better involvement by national parliaments in 
European decision-making’ (Blair, 2002), with the power to decide whether legislation 
25 
 
passed the subsidiarity test shifting from Commission and Council to national parliaments via 
‘new early warning rights’ (Blair, 2002). In sum, although leaders of both parties advanced a 
robust defence of national sovereignty, Conservative leaders believed European institutions 
to be more dysfunctional than did their Labour counterparts, and hence to present more of an 
existential threat to British interests. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that several different historiographical conceptions of Britain’s 
‘outsider’ status have surfaced in London’s European policy discourse and practice from the 
days of Empire to the present – even when Britain had been inside the EEC for over four 
decades. Why was this? Because London’s policy-makers have struggled to balance the 
structural imperative of making a continental commitment against their discursively 
expressed ideological preference for a limited liability policy towards European integration.  
Through gaining EEC membership in 1973 it appeared that British elites had firmly decided 
to quash the limited liability approach to European affairs in British foreign policy thinking, 
replacing it with a continental commitment. Narratives associated with Phase 1 (balancer), 
Phase 3a (saboteur) and Phase 4 (supplicant) were rejected in favour of an emphasis on the 
constructive role Britain could play as an ‘insider’ in Phase 5. Alongside this, they claimed an 
exceptional status that gave Britain the legitimacy to lead later Phase 3b-style ‘rival’ 
approaches to integration, sold using the rhetoric of Phase 2’s ‘benevolent support’. In this 
way, ‘Europe’ has continued to be constructed as a ‘club’ with a ‘membership fee’, a 
grouping that Britain can choose to join or leave as its interests dictate (see Nigel Farage’s 
opening statement in the first television debate (Youtube 2014)).  
An interpretivist account of elite discourse from Thatcher  to Cameron suggests that, 
in truth, withdrawal from the EU would be more in line with expressed British identity 
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constructions than would continued EU membership, much as this finding might surprise the 
leaders studied here. No British leader since 1973 has ever proposed that Britain leave the EU 
– and yet they have never attempted seriously to challenge the strong notion of outsider-liness 
underpinning Britain’s status as a reluctant partner in the organization. Into this space have 
stepped a host of anti-European parties and civil society actors, notably in the tabloid and 
Eurosceptic broadsheet media, who have effectively exploited the lack of purpose in the pro-
European movement. All this means that the ‘Brexit’ option is now firmly on the national 
political agenda, and will be the foreseeable future. 
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